Therefore there is also a natural fear.
Obj. 3: Further, fear is opposed to hope, as stated above (Q. 40, A.
4, ad 1). But there is a hope of nature, as is evident from Rom.
4:18, where it is said of Abraham that "against hope" of nature, "he
believed in hope" of grace. Therefore there is also a fear of nature.
_On the contrary,_ That which is natural is common to things animate
and inanimate. But fear is not in things inanimate. Therefore there
is no natural fear.
_I answer that,_ A movement is said to be natural, because nature
inclines thereto. Now this happens in two ways. First, so that it is
entirely accomplished by nature, without any operation of the
apprehensive faculty: thus to have an upward movement is natural to
fire, and to grow is the natural movement of animals and plants.
Secondly, a movement is said to be natural, if nature inclines
thereto, though it be accomplished by the apprehensive faculty alone:
since, as stated above (Q. 10, A. 1), the movements of the cognitive
and appetitive faculties are reducible to nature as to their first
principle. In this way, even the acts of the apprehensive power, such
as understanding, feeling, and remembering, as well as the movements
of the animal appetite, are sometimes said to be natural.
And in this sense we may say that there is a natural fear; and it is
distinguished from non-natural fear, by reason of the diversity of
its object. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), there is a
fear of "corruptive evil," which nature shrinks from on account of
its natural desire to exist; and such fear is said to be natural.
Again, there is a fear of "painful evil," which is repugnant not to
nature, but to the desire of the appetite; and such fear is not
natural. In this sense we have stated above (Q. 26, A. 1; Q. 30, A.
3; Q. 31, A. 7) that love, desire, and pleasure are divisible into
natural and non-natural.
But in the first sense of the word "natural," we must observe that
certain passions of the soul are sometimes said to be natural, as
love, desire, and hope; whereas the others cannot be called natural.
The reason of this is because love and hatred, desire and avoidance,
imply a certain inclination to pursue what is good or to avoid what
is evil; which inclination is to be found in the natural appetite
also. Consequently there is a natural love; while we may also speak
of desire and hope as being even in natural things devoid of
knowledge. On the other
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