ause; but not that which
ensues from our own will. Now fear partly arises from an extrinsic
cause, and is partly subject to the will. It is due to an extrinsic
cause, in so far as it is a passion resulting from the imagination of
an imminent evil. In this sense it is possible for fear to be the
object of fear, i.e. a man may fear lest he should be threatened by
the necessity of fearing, through being assailed by some great evil.
It is subject to the will, in so far as the lower appetite obeys
reason; wherefore man is able to drive fear away. In this sense fear
cannot be the object of fear, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33).
Lest, however, anyone make use of his arguments, in order to prove
that fear cannot be at all be the object of fear, we must add a
solution to the same.

Reply Obj. 1: Not every fear is identically the same; there are
various fears according to the various objects of fear. Nothing,
then, prevents a man from keeping himself from fearing one thing, by
fearing another, so that the fear which he has preserves him from the
fear which he has not.

Reply Obj. 2: Since fear of an imminent evil is not identical with
the fear of the fear of imminent evil; it does not follow that a
thing flies from itself, or that it is the same flight in both cases.

Reply Obj. 3: On account of the various kinds of fear already alluded
to (ad 2) a man's present fear may have a future fear for its object.
________________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 42, Art. 5]

Whether Sudden Things Are Especially Feared?

Objection 1: It would seem that unwonted and sudden things are not
especially feared. Because, as hope is about good things, so fear is
about evil things. But experience conduces to the increase of hope in
good things. Therefore it also adds to fear in evil things.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those are
feared most, not who are quick-tempered, but who are gentle and
cunning." Now it is clear that those who are quick-tempered are more
subject to sudden emotions. Therefore sudden things are less to be
feared.

Obj. 3: Further, we think less about things that happen suddenly. But
the more we think about a thing, the more we fear it; hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "some appear to be courageous
through ignorance, but as soon as they discover that the case is
different from what they expected, they run away." Therefore sudden
things are feared less.

_On the contrar