mself in ambush: and then it is true that evil inspires
greater fear through being much thought about.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 42, Art. 6]
Whether Those Things Are More Feared, for Which There Is No Remedy?
Objection 1: It would seem that those things are not more to be
feared, for which there is no remedy. Because it is a condition of
fear, that there be some hope of safety, as stated above (A. 2). But
an evil that cannot be remedied leaves no hope of escape. Therefore
such things are not feared at all.
Obj. 2: Further, there is no remedy for the evil of death: since, in
the natural course of things, there is no return from death to life.
And yet death is not the most feared of all things, as the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore those things are not feared
most, for which there is no remedy.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 6) that "a thing
which lasts long is no better than that which lasts but one day: nor
is that which lasts for ever any better than that which is not
everlasting": and the same applies to evil. But things that cannot be
remedied seem to differ from other things, merely in the point of
their lasting long or for ever. Consequently they are not therefore
any worse or more to be feared.
_On the contrary,_ the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those
things are most to be feared which when done wrong cannot be put
right . . . or for which there is no help, or which are not easy."
_I answer that,_ The object of fear is evil: consequently whatever
tends to increase evil, conduces to the increase of fear. Now evil
is increased not only in its species of evil, but also in respect of
circumstances, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 3). And of all the
circumstances, longlastingness, or even everlastingness, seems to
have the greatest bearing on the increase of evil. Because things
that exist in time are measured, in a way, according to the duration
of time: wherefore if it be an evil to suffer something for a certain
length of time, we should reckon the evil doubled, if it be suffered
for twice that length of time. And accordingly, to suffer the same
thing for an infinite length of time, i.e. for ever, implies, so to
speak, an infinite increase. Now those evils which, after they have
come, cannot be remedied at all, or at least not easily, are
considered as lasting for ever or for a long time: for which reason
they inspire the greatest fear.
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