nt of anger is more impetuous, through
the heating of the bile. Hence the passage quoted continues: "Who can
bear the violence of one provoked?"

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above, an angry man wishes evil to someone,
in so far as this evil is a means of just vengeance. Now vengeance is
wrought by the infliction of a punishment: and the nature of
punishment consists in being contrary to the will, painful, and
inflicted for some fault. Consequently an angry man desires this,
that the person whom he is hurting, may feel it and be in pain, and
know that this has befallen him on account of the harm he has done
the other. The hater, on the other hand, cares not for all this,
since he desires another's evil as such. It is not true, however,
that an evil is worse through giving pain: because "injustice and
imprudence, although evil," yet, being voluntary, "do not grieve
those in whom they are," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 4).

Reply Obj. 3: That which proceeds from several causes, is more
settled when these causes are of one kind: but it may be that one
cause prevails over many others. Now hatred ensues from a more
lasting cause than anger does. Because anger arises from an emotion
of the soul due to the wrong inflicted; whereas hatred ensues from a
disposition in a man, by reason of which he considers that which he
hates to be contrary and hurtful to him. Consequently, as passion is
more transitory than disposition or habit, so anger is less lasting
than hatred; although hatred itself is a passion ensuing from this
disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "hatred
is more incurable than anger."
________________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 7]

Whether Anger Is Only Towards Those to Whom One Has an Obligation of
Justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not only towards those to
whom one has an obligation of justice. For there is no justice
between man and irrational beings. And yet sometimes one is angry
with irrational beings; thus, out of anger, a writer throws away his
pen, or a rider strikes his horse. Therefore anger is not only
towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice.

Obj. 2: Further, "there is no justice towards oneself . . . nor is
there justice towards one's own" (Ethic. v, 6). But sometimes a man
is angry with himself; for instance, a penitent, on account of his
sin; hence it is written (Ps. 4:5): "Be ye angry and sin not."
Therefore anger is n