But anger is caused by
the concurrence of several passions, as stated above (A. 1): whereas
hatred is not. Therefore anger is more settled and more grievous than
hatred.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine, in his Rule, compares hatred to "a
beam," but anger to "a mote."

_I answer that,_ The species and nature of a passion are taken from
its object. Now the object of anger is the same in substance as the
object of hatred; since, just as the hater wishes evil to him whom he
hates, so does the angry man wish evil to him with whom he is angry.
But there is a difference of aspect: for the hater wishes evil to his
enemy, as evil, whereas the angry man wishes evil to him with whom he
is angry, not as evil but in so far as it has an aspect of good, that
is, in so far as he reckons it as just, since it is a means of
vengeance. Wherefore also it has been said above (A. 2) that hatred
implies application of evil to evil, whereas anger denotes
application of good to evil. Now it is evident that to seek evil
under the aspect of justice, is a lesser evil, than simply to seek
evil to someone. Because to wish evil to someone under the aspect of
justice, may be according to the virtue of justice, if it be in
conformity with the order of reason; and anger fails only in this,
that it does not obey the precept of reason in taking vengeance.
Consequently it is evident that hatred is far worse and graver than
anger.

Reply Obj. 1: In anger and hatred two points may be considered:
namely, the thing desired, and the intensity of the desire. As to the
thing desired, anger has more mercy than hatred has. For since hatred
desires another's evil for evil's sake, it is satisfied with no
particular measure of evil: because those things that are desired for
their own sake, are desired without measure, as the Philosopher
states (Polit. i, 3), instancing a miser with regard to riches. Hence
it is written (Ecclus. 12:16): "An enemy . . . if he find an
opportunity, will not be satisfied with blood." Anger, on the other
hand, seeks evil only under the aspect of a just means of vengeance.
Consequently when the evil inflicted goes beyond the measure of
justice according to the estimate of the angry man, then he has
mercy. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "the angry
man is appeased if many evils befall, whereas the hater is never
appeased."

As to the intensity of the desire, anger excludes mercy more than
hatred does; because the moveme