ue to a bilious temperament; and of all the
humors, the bile moves quickest; for it is like fire. Consequently he
that is temperamentally disposed to anger is sooner incensed with
anger, than he that is temperamentally disposed to desire, is
inflamed with desire: and for this reason the Philosopher says
(Ethic. vii, 6) that a disposition to anger is more liable to be
transmitted from parent to child, than a disposition to desire.
Reply Obj. 1: We may consider in man both the natural temperament on
the part of the body, and the reason. On the part of the bodily
temperament, a man, considered specifically, does not naturally excel
others either in anger or in any other passion, on account of the
moderation of his temperament. But other animals, for as much as
their temperament recedes from this moderation and approaches to an
extreme disposition, are naturally disposed to some excess of
passion, such as the lion in daring, the hound in anger, the hare in
fear, and so forth. On the part of reason, however, it is natural to
man, both to be angry and to be gentle: in so far as reason somewhat
causes anger, by denouncing the injury which causes anger; and
somewhat appeases anger, in so far as the angry man "does not listen
perfectly to the command of reason," as stated above (A. 4, ad 3).
Reply Obj. 2: Reason itself belongs to the nature of man: wherefore
from the very fact that anger requires an act of reason, it follows
that it is, in a manner, natural to man.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument regards anger and desire on the part of
the object.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 6]
Whether Anger Is More Grievous Than Hatred?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is more grievous than hatred.
For it is written (Prov. 27:4) that "anger hath no mercy, nor fury
when it breaketh forth." But hatred sometimes has mercy. Therefore
anger is more grievous than hatred.
Obj. 2: Further, it is worse to suffer evil and to grieve for it,
than merely to suffer it. But when a man hates, he is contented if
the object of his hatred suffer evil: whereas the angry man is not
satisfied unless the object of his anger know it and be aggrieved
thereby, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4). Therefore, anger is
more grievous than hatred.
Obj. 3: Further, a thing seems to be so much the more firm according
as more things concur to set it up: thus a habit is all the more
settled through being caused by several acts.
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