and we hate
someone, in so far as we wish some evil to be in him. It is the same
with anger; for when a man is angry, he wishes to be avenged on
someone. Hence the movement of anger has a twofold tendency: viz. to
vengeance itself, which it desires and hopes for as being a good,
wherefore it takes pleasure in it; and to the person on whom it seeks
vengeance, as to something contrary and hurtful, which bears the
character of evil.

We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this respect,
between anger on the one side, and hatred and love on the other. The
first difference is that anger always regards two objects: whereas
love and hatred sometimes regard but one object, as when a man is
said to love wine or something of the kind, or to hate it. The second
difference is, that both the objects of love are good: since the
lover wishes good to someone, as to something agreeable to himself:
while both the objects of hatred bear the character of evil: for the
man who hates, wishes evil to someone, as to something disagreeable
to him. Whereas anger regards one object under the aspect of evil,
viz. the noxious person, on whom it seeks to be avenged. Consequently
it is a passion somewhat made up of contrary passions.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 3]

Whether Anger Is in the Concupiscible Faculty?

Objection 1: It would seem that anger is in the concupiscible
faculty. For Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that anger is a
kind of "desire." But desire is in the concupiscible faculty.
Therefore anger is too.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says in his Rule, that "anger grows into
hatred": and Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that "hatred is
inveterate anger." But hatred, like love, is a concupiscible passion.
Therefore anger is in the concupiscible faculty.

Obj. 3: Further, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of
Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] say that "anger is made up of
sorrow and desire." Both of these are in the concupiscible faculty.
Therefore anger is a concupiscible passion.

_On the contrary,_ The concupiscible is distinct from the irascible
faculty. If, therefore, anger were in the concupiscible power, the
irascible would not take its name from it.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 23, A. 1), the passions of the
irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible faculty,
in that the objects of th