e concupiscible passions are good and evil
absolutely considered, whereas the objects of the irascible passions
are good and evil in a certain elevation or arduousness. Now it has
been stated (A. 2) that anger regards two objects: viz. the vengeance
that it seeks; and the person on whom it seeks vengeance; and in
respect of both, anger requires a certain arduousness: for the
movement of anger does not arise, unless there be some magnitude
about both these objects; since "we make no ado about things that are
naught or very minute," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 2). It
is therefore evident that anger is not in the concupiscible, but in
the irascible faculty.

Reply Obj. 1: Cicero gives the name of desire to any kind of craving
for a future good, without discriminating between that which is
arduous and that which is not. Accordingly he reckons anger as a kind
of desire, inasmuch as it is a desire of vengeance. In this sense,
however, desire is common to the irascible and concupiscible
faculties.

Reply Obj. 2: Anger is said to grow into hatred, not as though the
same passion which at first was anger, afterwards becomes hatred by
becoming inveterate; but by a process of causality. For anger when it
lasts a long time engenders hatred.

Reply Obj. 3: Anger is said to be composed of sorrow and desire, not
as though they were its parts, but because they are its causes: and
it has been said above (Q. 25, A. 2) that the concupiscible passions
are the causes of the irascible passions.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 4]

Whether Anger Requires an Act of Reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not require an act of
reason. For, since anger is a passion, it is in the sensitive
appetite. But the sensitive appetite follows an apprehension, not of
reason, but of the sensitive faculty. Therefore anger does not
require an act of reason.

Obj. 2: Further, dumb animals are devoid of reason: and yet they are
seen to be angry. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.

Obj. 3: Further, drunkenness fetters the reason; whereas it is
conducive to anger. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger
listens to reason somewhat."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), anger is a desire for
vengeance. Now vengeance implies a comparison between the punishment
to be inflicted and the hurt done; wherefore