roper nature, i.e. as a voluntary act; for
considered in this light it is not an object of fear to him.

Reply Obj. 1: Separation from God is a punishment resulting from sin:
and every punishment is, in some way, due to an extrinsic cause.

Reply Obj. 2: Sorrow and fear agree in one point, since each regards
evil: they differ, however, in two points. First, because sorrow is
about present evil, whereas fear is future evil. Secondly, because
sorrow, being in the concupiscible faculty, regards evil absolutely;
wherefore it can be about any evil, great or small; whereas fear,
being in the irascible part, regards evil with the addition of a
certain arduousness or difficulty; which difficulty ceases in so far
as a thing is subject to the will. Consequently not all things that
give us pain when they are present, make us fear when they are yet to
come, but only some things, namely, those that are difficult.

Reply Obj. 3: Hope is of good that is obtainable. Now one may obtain
a good either of oneself, or through another: and so, hope may be of
an act of virtue, which lies within our own power. On the other hand,
fear is of an evil that does not lie in our own power: and
consequently the evil which is feared is always from an extrinsic
cause; while the good that is hoped for may be both from an intrinsic
and from an extrinsic cause.

Reply Obj. 4: As stated above (Q. 41, A. 4, ad 2, 3), shame is not
fear of the very act of sin, but of the disgrace or ignominy which
arises therefrom, and which is due to an extrinsic cause.
________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 42, Art. 4]

Whether Fear Itself Can Be Feared?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear cannot be feared. For whatever
is feared, is prevented from being lost, through fear thereof: thus a
man who fears to lose his health, keeps it, through fearing its loss.
If therefore a man be afraid of fear, he will keep himself from fear
by being afraid: which seems absurd.

Obj. 2: Further, fear is a kind of flight. But nothing flies from
itself. Therefore fear cannot be the object of fear.

Obj. 3: Further, fear is about the future. But fear is present to him
that fears. Therefore it cannot be the object of his fear.

_On the contrary,_ A man can love his own love, and can grieve at his
own sorrow. Therefore, in like manner, he can fear his own fear.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), nothing can be an object of
fear, save what is due to an extrinsic c