the very fact that it is
a privation of some good. Wherefore, since evil is shunned because it
is evil, it follows that it is shunned because it deprives one of the
good that one pursues through love thereof. And in this sense
Augustine says that there is no cause for fear, save loss of the good
we love.
In another way, good stands related to evil as its cause: in so far
as some good can by its power bring harm to the good we love: and so,
just as hope, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 7), regards two things,
namely, the good to which it tends, and the thing through which there
is a hope of obtaining the desired good; so also does fear regard two
things, namely, the evil from which it shrinks, and that good which,
by its power, can inflict that evil. In this way God is feared by
man, inasmuch as He can inflict punishment, spiritual or corporal. In
this way, too, we fear the power of man; especially when it has been
thwarted, or when it is unjust, because then it is more likely to do
us a harm.
In like manner one fears _to be over another,_ i.e. to lean on
another, so that it is in his power to do us a harm: thus a man fears
another, who knows him to be guilty of a crime, lest he reveal it to
others.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 42, Art. 2]
Whether Evil of Nature Is an Object of Fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that evil of nature is not an object of
fear. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes us take
counsel." But we do not take counsel about things which happen
naturally, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 3. Therefore evil of nature is
not an object of fear.
Obj. 2: Further, natural defects such as death and the like are
always threatening man. If therefore such like evils were an object
of fear, man would needs be always in fear.
Obj. 3: Further, nature does not move to contraries. But evil of
nature is an effect of nature. Therefore if a man shrinks from such
like evils through fear thereof, this is not an effect of nature.
Therefore natural fear is not of the evil of nature; and yet it seems
that it should be.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6) that "the
most terrible of all things is death," which is an evil of nature.
_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), fear is
caused by the "imagination of a future evil which is either
corruptive or painful." Now just as a painful evil is t
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