hand the other passions of the soul denote
certain movements, whereto the natural inclination is nowise
sufficient. This is due either to the fact that perception or
knowledge is essential to these passions (thus we have said, Q. 31,
AA. 1, 3; Q. 35, A. 1, that apprehension is a necessary condition of
pleasure and sorrow), wherefore things devoid of knowledge cannot be
said to take pleasure or to be sorrowful: or else it is because such
like movements are contrary to the very nature of natural
inclination: for instance, despair flies from good on account of some
difficulty; and fear shrinks from repelling a contrary evil; both of
which are contrary to the inclination of nature. Wherefore such like
passions are in no way ascribed to inanimate beings.

Thus the Replies to the Objections are evident.
________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 41, Art. 4]

Whether the Species of Fear Are Suitably Assigned?

Objection 1: It would seem that six species of fear are unsuitably
assigned by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15); namely, "laziness,
shamefacedness, shame, amazement, stupor, and anxiety." Because, as
the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear regards a saddening evil."
Therefore the species of fear should correspond to the species of
sorrow. Now there are four species of sorrow, as stated above (Q. 35,
A. 8). Therefore there should only be four species of fear
corresponding to them.

Obj. 2: Further, that which consists in an action of our own is in
our power. But fear regards an evil that surpasses our power, as
stated above (A. 2). Therefore laziness, shamefacedness, and shame,
which regard our own actions, should not be reckoned as species of
fear.

Obj. 3: Further, fear is of the future, as stated above (AA. 1, 2).
But "shame regards a disgraceful deed already done," as Gregory of
Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx.] says. Therefore shame is not a
species of fear.

Obj. 4: Further, fear is only of evil. But amazement and stupor
regard great and unwonted things, whether good or evil. Therefore
amazement and stupor are not species of fear.

Obj. 5: Further, Philosophers have been led by amazement to seek the
truth, as stated in the beginning of _Metaph._ But fear leads to
flight rather than to search. Therefore amazement is not a species of
fear.

On the contrary suffices the authority of Damascene and Gregory of
Nyssa [*Nemesius] (Cf. Obj. 1, 3).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), fear reg