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r of flight, strive less to fly, but hope to avenge their death: and therefore in this hope they fight the more bravely, and consequently prove dangerous to the foe. ________________________ QUESTION 41 OF FEAR, IN ITSELF (In Four Articles) We must now consider, in the first place, fear; and, secondly, daring. With regard to fear, four things must be considered: (1) Fear, in itself; (2) Its object; (3) Its cause; (4) Its effect. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether fear is a passion of the soul? (2) Whether fear is a special passion? (3) Whether there is a natural fear? (4) Of the species of fear. ________________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 41, Art. 1] Whether Fear Is a Passion of the Soul? Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a passion of the soul. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that "fear is a power, by way of _systole_"--i.e. of contraction--"desirous of vindicating nature." But no virtue is a passion, as is proved in _Ethic._ ii, 5. Therefore fear is not a passion. Obj. 2: Further, every passion is an effect due to the presence of an agent. But fear is not of something present, but of something future, as Damascene declares (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). Therefore fear is not a passion. Obj. 3: Further, every passion of the soul is a movement of the sensitive appetite, in consequence of an apprehension of the senses. But sense apprehends, not the future but the present. Since, then, fear is of future evil, it seems that it is not a passion of the soul. _On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 5, seqq.) reckons fear among the other passions of the soul. _I answer that,_ Among the other passions of the soul, after sorrow, fear chiefly has the character of passion. For as we have stated above (Q. 22), the notion of passion implies first of all a movement of a passive power--i.e. of a power whose object is compared to it as its active principle: since passion is the effect of an agent. In this way, both _to feel_ and _to understand_ are passions. Secondly, more properly speaking, passion is a movement of the appetitive power; and more properly still, it is a movement of an appetitive power that has a bodily organ, such movement being accompanied by a bodily transmutation. And, again, most properly those movements are called passions, which imply some deterioration. Now it is evident that fear, since it regards evil, belongs to the a
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