men." Wherefore the movement of
hope is sometimes called expectation, on account of the preceding
inspection of the cognitive power.

Reply Obj. 2: When a man desires a thing and reckons that he can get
it, he believes that he can get it, he believes that he will get it;
and from this belief which precedes in the cognitive power, the
ensuing movement in the appetite is called confidence. Because the
movement of the appetite takes its name from the knowledge that
precedes it, as an effect from a cause which is better known; for the
apprehensive power knows its own act better than that of the appetite.

Reply Obj. 3: Certainty is ascribed to the movement, not only of the
sensitive, but also of the natural appetite; thus we say that a stone
is certain to tend downwards. This is owing to the inerrancy which
the movement of the sensitive or even natural appetite derives from
the certainty of the knowledge that precedes it.
________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 40, Art. 3]

Whether Hope Is in Dumb Animals?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no hope in dumb animals.
Because hope is for some future good, as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii, 12). But knowledge of the future is not in the competency
of dumb animals, whose knowledge is confined to the senses and does
not extend to the future. Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals.

Obj. 2: Further, the object of hope is a future good, possible of
attainment. But possible and impossible are differences of the true
and the false, which are only in the mind, as the Philosopher states
(Metaph. vi, 4). Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals, since
they have no mind.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that "animals
are moved by the things that they see." But hope is of things unseen:
"for what a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" (Rom. 8:24). Therefore
there is no hope in dumb animals.

_On the contrary,_ Hope is an irascible passion. But the irascible
faculty is in dumb animals. Therefore hope is also.

_I answer that,_ The internal passions of animals can be gathered
from their outward movements: from which it is clear that hope is in
dumb animals. For if a dog see a hare, or a hawk see a bird, too far
off, it makes no movement towards it, as having no hope to catch it:
whereas, if it be near, it makes a movement towards it, as being in
hopes of catching it. Because as stated above (Q. 1, A. 2; Q. 26, A.
1; Q. 35, A. 1), the s