_desperatio_) implies that
it is contrary to hope (_spes_).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 23, A. 2), there is a twofold
contrariety of movements. One is in respect of approach to contrary
terms: and this contrariety alone is to be found in the concupiscible
passions, for instance between love and hatred. The other is
according to approach and withdrawal with regard to the same term;
and is to be found in the irascible passions, as stated above (Q. 23,
A. 2). Now the object of hope, which is the arduous good, has the
character of a principle of attraction, if it be considered in the
light of something attainable; and thus hope tends thereto, for it
denotes a kind of approach. But in so far as it is considered as
unobtainable, it has the character of a principle of repulsion,
because, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 3, "when men come to an
impossibility they disperse." And this is how despair stands in
regard to this object, wherefore it implies a movement of withdrawal:
and consequently it is contrary to hope, as withdrawal is to approach.

Reply Obj. 1: Fear is contrary to hope, because their objects, i.e.
good and evil, are contrary: for this contrariety is found in the
irascible passions, according as they ensue from the passions of the
concupiscible. But despair is contrary to hope, only by contrariety
of approach and withdrawal.

Reply Obj. 2: Despair does not regard evil as such; sometimes however
it regards evil accidentally, as making the difficult good impossible
to obtain. But it can arise from the mere excess of good.

Reply Obj. 3: Despair implies not only privation of hope, but also a
recoil from the thing desired, by reason of its being esteemed
impossible to get. Hence despair, like hope, presupposes desire;
because we neither hope for nor despair of that which we do not
desire to have. For this reason, too, each of them regards the good,
which is the object of desire.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 40, Art. 5]

Whether Experience Is a Cause of Hope?

Objection 1: It would seem that experience is not a cause of hope.
Because experience belongs to the cognitive power; wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual virtue needs
experience and time." But hope is not in the cognitive power, but in
the appetite, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore experience is not a
cause of hope.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 13) that "the old
are slow to h