oul is a greater evil than that which is an evil to the body.
Therefore this argument does not prove: nor does Augustine give it as
his own, but as taken from another [*Cornelius Celsus].
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QUESTION 40
OF THE IRASCIBLE PASSIONS, AND FIRST, OF HOPE AND DESPAIR
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider the irascible passions: (1) Hope and despair;
(2) Fear and daring; (3) Anger. Under first head there are eight
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether hope is the same as desire or cupidity?
(2) Whether hope is in the apprehensive, or in the appetitive
faculty?
(3) Whether hope is in dumb animals?
(4) Whether despair is contrary to hope?
(5) Whether experience is a cause of hope?
(6) Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards?
(7) Concerning the order of hope to love;
(8) Whether love conduces to action?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 40, Art. 1]
Whether Hope Is the Same As Desire or Cupidity?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is the same as desire or
cupidity. Because hope is reckoned as one of the four principal
passions. But Augustine in setting down the four principal passions
puts cupidity in the place of hope (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3, 7). Therefore
hope is the same as cupidity or desire.
Obj. 2: Further, passions differ according to their objects. But the
object of hope is the same as the object of cupidity or desire, viz.
the future good. Therefore hope is the same as cupidity or desire.
Obj. 3: If it be said that hope, in addition to desire, denotes the
possibility of obtaining the future good; on the contrary, whatever
is accidental to the object does not make a different species of
passion. But possibility of acquisition is accidental to a future
good, which is the object of cupidity or desire, and of hope.
Therefore hope does not differ specifically from desire or cupidity.
_On the contrary,_ To different powers belong different species of
passions. But hope is in the irascible power; whereas desire or
cupidity is in the concupiscible. Therefore hope differs specifically
from desire or cupidity.
_I answer that,_ The species of a passion is taken from the object.
Now, in the object of hope, we may note four conditions. First, that
it is something good; since, properly speaking, hope regards only the
good; in this respect, hope differs from fear, which regards evil.
Secondly, that it is future; for hope does not regard that which is
prese
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