nt and already possessed: in this respect, hope differs from joy
which regards a present good. Thirdly, that it must be something
arduous and difficult to obtain, for we do not speak of any one
hoping for trifles, which are in one's power to have at any time: in
this respect, hope differs from desire or cupidity, which regards the
future good absolutely: wherefore it belongs to the concupiscible,
while hope belongs to the irascible faculty. Fourthly, that this
difficult thing is something possible to obtain: for one does not
hope for that which one cannot get at all: and, in this respect, hope
differs from despair. It is therefore evident that hope differs from
desire, as the irascible passions differ from the concupiscible. For
this reason, moreover, hope presupposes desire: just as all irascible
passions presuppose the passions of the concupiscible faculty, as
stated above (Q. 25, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine mentions desire instead of hope, because each
regards future good; and because the good which is not arduous is
reckoned as nothing: thus implying that desire seems to tend chiefly
to the arduous good, to which hope tends likewise.

Reply Obj. 2: The object of hope is the future good considered, not
absolutely, but as arduous and difficult of attainment, as stated
above.

Reply Obj. 3: The object of hope adds not only possibility to the
object of desire, but also difficulty: and this makes hope belong to
another power, viz. the irascible, which regards something difficult,
as stated in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2). Moreover, possibility and
impossibility are not altogether accidental to the object of the
appetitive power: because the appetite is a principle of movement;
and nothing is moved to anything except under the aspect of being
possible; for no one is moved to that which he reckons impossible to
get. Consequently hope differs from despair according to the
difference of possible and impossible.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 40, Art. 2]

Whether Hope Is in the Apprehensive or in the Appetitive Power?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope belongs to the cognitive power.
Because hope, seemingly, is a kind of awaiting; for the Apostle says
(Rom. 8:25): "If we hope for that which we see not; we wait for it
with patience." But awaiting seems to belong to the cognitive power,
which we exercise by _looking out._ Therefore hope belongs to the
cognitive power.

Obj. 2: Further, appar