ement of
flight or contraction, are repugnant to the vital movement, not only
as regards its measure, but also as regards its species; wherefore
they are simply harmful: such are fear and despair, and above all
sorrow which depresses the soul by reason of a present evil, which
makes a stronger impression than future evil.
Reply Obj. 1: Since the soul naturally moves the body, the spiritual
movement of the soul is naturally the cause of bodily transmutation.
Nor is there any parallel with spiritual images, because they are not
naturally ordained to move such other bodies as are not naturally
moved by the soul.
Reply Obj. 2: Other passions imply a bodily transmutation
which is specifically in conformity with the vital movement: whereas
sorrow implies a transmutation that is repugnant thereto, as stated
above.
Reply Obj. 3: A lesser cause suffices to hinder the use of
reason, than to destroy life: since we observe that many ailments
deprive one of the use of reason, before depriving one of life.
Nevertheless fear and anger cause very great harm to the body, by
reason of the sorrow which they imply, and which arises from the
absence of the thing desired. Moreover sorrow too sometimes deprives
man of the use of reason: as may be seen in those who through sorrow
become a prey to melancholy or madness.
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QUESTION 38
OF THE REMEDIES OF SORROW OR PAIN
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the remedies of pain or sorrow: under which head
there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure?
(2) Whether it is assuaged by weeping?
(3) Whether it is assuaged by the sympathy of friends?
(4) Whether it is assuaged by contemplating the truth?
(5) Whether it is assuaged by sleep and baths?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 38, Art. 1]
Whether Pain or Sorrow Is Assuaged by Every Pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that not every pleasure assuages every
pain or sorrow. For pleasure does not assuage sorrow, save in so far
as it is contrary to it: for "remedies work by contraries" (Ethic.
ii, 3). But not every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow; as stated
above (Q. 35, A. 4). Therefore not every pleasure assuages every
sorrow.
Obj. 2: Further, that which causes sorrow does not assuage it. But
some pleasures cause sorrow; since, as stated in _Ethic._ ix, 4, "the
wicked man feels pain at having been pleased." Therefore not ev
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