urther if it be harmful to the body, this can only be due to
its having a bodily transmutation in conjunction with it. But bodily
transmutation takes place in all the passions of the soul, as stated
above (Q. 22, AA. 1, 3). Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the
body than the other passions of the soul.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that "anger and
desire drive some to madness": which seems to be a very great harm,
since reason is the most excellent thing in man. Moreover, despair
seems to be more harmful than sorrow; for it is the cause of sorrow.
Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other
passions of the soul.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 17:22): "A joyful mind maketh
age flourishing: a sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones": and (Prov.
25:20): "As a moth doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood: so the
sadness of a man consumeth the heart": and (Ecclus. 38:19): "Of
sadness cometh death."

_I answer that,_ Of all the soul's passions, sorrow is most harmful
to the body. The reason of this is because sorrow is repugnant to
man's life in respect of the species of its movement, and not merely
in respect of its measure or quantity, as is the case with the other
passions of the soul. For man's life consists in a certain movement,
which flows from the heart to the other parts of the body: and this
movement is befitting to human nature according to a certain fixed
measure. Consequently if this movement goes beyond the right measure,
it will be repugnant to man's life in respect of the measure of
quantity; but not in respect of its specific character: whereas if
this movement be hindered in its progress, it will be repugnant to
life in respect of its species.

Now it must be noted that, in all the passions of the soul, the
bodily transmutation which is their material element, is in
conformity with and in proportion to the appetitive movement, which
is the formal element: just as in everything matter is proportionate
to form. Consequently those passions that imply a movement of the
appetite in pursuit of something, are not repugnant to the vital
movement as regards its species, but they may be repugnant thereto as
regards its measure: such are love, joy, desire and the like;
wherefore these passions conduce to the well-being of the body;
though, if they be excessive, they may be harmful to it. On the other
hand, those passions which denote in the appetite a mov