he passage quoted above it is said
expressively: "Sadness of the heart is every wound," because even the
pains of outward wounds are comprised in the interior sorrows of the
heart.
Reply Obj. 1: Inward pain can also arise from things that are
destructive of life. And then the comparison of inward to outward
pain must not be taken in reference to the various evils that cause
pain; but in regard to the various ways in which this cause of pain
is compared to the appetite.
Reply Obj. 2: Inward pain is not caused by the apprehended likeness
of a thing: for a man is not inwardly pained by the apprehended
likeness itself, but by the thing which the likeness represents. And
this thing is all the more perfectly apprehended by means of its
likeness, as this likeness is more immaterial and abstract.
Consequently inward pain is, of itself, greater, as being caused by a
greater evil, forasmuch as evil is better known by an inward
apprehension.
Reply Obj. 3: Bodily changes are more liable to be caused by outward
pain, both from the fact that outward pain is caused by a corruptive
conjoined corporally, which is a necessary condition of the sense of
touch; and from the fact that the outward sense is more material than
the inward sense, just as the sensitive appetite is more material
than the intellective. For this reason, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3;
Q. 31, A. 5), the body undergoes a greater change from the movement
of the sensitive appetite: and, in like manner, from outward than
from inward pain.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 8]
Whether There Are Only Four Species of Sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that Damascene's (De Fide Orth. ii, 14)
division of sorrow into four species is incorrect; viz. into "torpor,
distress," which Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.]
calls "anxiety,"--"pity," and "envy." For sorrow is contrary to
pleasure. But there are not several species of pleasure. Therefore it
is incorrect to assign different species of sorrow.
Obj. 2: Further, _Repentance_ is a species of sorrow; and so are
_indignation_ and _jealousy,_ as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9,
11). But these are not included in the above species. Therefore this
division is insufficient.
Obj. 3: Further, the members of a division should be things that are
opposed to one another. But these species are not opposed to one
another. For according to Gregory [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.]
"torpo
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