ater and is shunned
more than interior sorrow.

_On the contrary,_ it is written (Ecclus. 25:17): "The sadness of the
heart is every wound [Douay: 'plague'], and the wickedness of a woman
is all evil." Therefore, just as the wickedness of a woman surpasses
all other wickedness, as the text implies; so sadness of the heart
surpasses every outward wound.

_I answer that,_ Interior and exterior pain agree in one point and
differ in two. They agree in this, that each is a movement of the
appetitive power, as stated above (A. 1). But they differ in respect
of those two things which are requisite for pain and pleasure;
namely, in respect of the cause, which is a conjoined good or evil;
and in respect of the apprehension. For the cause of outward pain is
a conjoined evil repugnant to the body; while the cause of inward
pain is a conjoined evil repugnant to the appetite. Again, outward
pain arises from an apprehension of sense, chiefly of touch; while
inward pain arises from an interior apprehension, of the imagination
or of the reason.

If then we compare the cause of inward pain to the cause of outward
pain, the former belongs, of itself, to the appetite to which both
these pains belong: while the latter belongs to the appetite
directly. Because inward pain arises from something being repugnant
to the appetite itself, while outward pain arises from something
being repugnant to the appetite, through being repugnant to the body.
Now, that which is of itself is always prior to that which is by
reason of another. Wherefore, from this point of view, inward pain
surpasses outward pain. In like manner also on the part of
apprehension: because the apprehension of reason and imagination is
of a higher order than the apprehension of the sense of touch.
Consequently inward pain is, simply and of itself, more keen than
outward pain: a sign whereof is that one willingly undergoes outward
pain in order to avoid inward pain: and in so far as outward pain is
not repugnant to the interior appetite, it becomes in a manner
pleasant and agreeable by way of inward joy. Sometimes, however,
outward pain is accompanied by inward pain, and then the pain is
increased. Because inward pain is not only greater than outward pain,
it is also more universal: since whatever is repugnant to the body,
can be repugnant to the interior appetite; and whatever is
apprehended by sense may be apprehended by imagination and reason,
but not conversely. Hence in t