of contemplation, but is in harmony with it,
as stated above.
Reply Obj. 5: Affliction of the flesh affects contemplation
accidentally and indirectly, as stated above.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 6]
Whether Sorrow Is to Be Shunned More Than Pleasure Is to Be Sought?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is to be shunned more than
pleasure is to be sought. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 63): "There
is nobody that does not shun sorrow more than he seeks pleasure." Now
that which all agree in doing, seems to be natural. Therefore it is
natural and right for sorrow to be shunned more than pleasure is
sought.
Obj. 2: Further, the action of a contrary conduces to rapidity and
intensity of movement: for "hot water freezes quicker and harder," as
the Philosopher says (Meteor. i, 12). But the shunning of sorrow is
due to the contrariety of the cause of sorrow; whereas the desire for
pleasure does not arise from any contrariety, but rather from the
suitableness of the pleasant object. Therefore sorrow is shunned more
eagerly than pleasure is sought.
Obj. 3: Further, the stronger the passion which a man resists
according to reason, the more worthy is he of praise, and the more
virtuous: since "virtue is concerned with the difficult and the good"
(Ethic. ii, 3). But the brave man who resists the movement of
shunning sorrow, is more virtuous than the temperate man, who resists
the movement of desire for pleasure: since the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 4) that "the brave and the just are chiefly praised."
Therefore the movement of shunning sorrow is more eager than the
movement of seeking pleasure.
_On the contrary,_ Good is stronger than evil, as Dionysius declares
(Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure is desirable for the sake of the good
which is its object; whereas the shunning of sorrow is on account of
evil. Therefore the desire for pleasure is more eager than the
shunning of sorrow.
_I answer that,_ The desire for pleasure is of itself more eager than
the shunning of sorrow. The reason of this is that the cause of
pleasure is a suitable good; while the cause of pain or sorrow is an
unsuitable evil. Now it happens that a certain good is suitable
without any repugnance at all: but it is not possible for any evil to
be so unsuitable as not to be suitable in some way. Wherefore
pleasure can be entire and perfect: whereas sorrow is always partial.
Therefore desire for pleasure is naturally
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