on of the organ, as the taste of something bitter, and
the smell of something foul; or from the sensible object, though
agreeable, being so continuous in its action on the sense, that it
exceeds the normal condition of the organ, as stated above (Q. 33, A.
2), the result being that an apprehension which at first was pleasant
becomes tedious. But these two things cannot occur directly in the
contemplation of the mind; because the mind has no corporeal organ:
wherefore it was said in the authority quoted above that intellectual
contemplation has neither "bitterness," nor "tediousness." Since,
however, the human mind, in contemplation, makes use of the sensitive
powers of apprehension, to whose acts weariness is incidental;
therefore some affliction or pain is indirectly mingled with
contemplation.

Nevertheless, in neither of these ways, is the pain thus accidentally
mingled with contemplation, contrary to the pleasure thereof. Because
pain caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not contrary to the
pleasure of contemplation, but rather is in affinity and in harmony
with it, as is evident from what has been said above (A. 4): while
pain or sorrow caused by bodily weariness, does not belong to the
same genus, wherefore it is altogether disparate. Accordingly it is
evident that no sorrow is contrary to pleasure taken in the very act
of contemplation; nor is any sorrow connected with it save
accidentally.

Reply Obj. 1: The "sorrow which is according to God," is not caused
by the very act of intellectual contemplation, but by something which
the mind contemplates: viz. by sin, which the mind considers as
contrary to the love of God.

Reply Obj. 2: Things which are contrary according to nature are not
contrary according as they exist in the mind: for things that are
contrary in reality are not contrary in the order of thought; indeed
rather is one contrary the reason for knowing the other. Hence one
and the same science considers contraries.

Reply Obj. 3: Contemplation, in itself, is never evil, since it is
nothing else than the consideration of truth, which is the good of
the intellect: it can, however, be evil accidentally, i.e. in so far
as the contemplation of a less noble object hinders the contemplation
of a more noble object; or on the part of the object contemplated, to
which the appetite is inordinately attached.

Reply Obj. 4: Sorrow caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not
contrary to the pleasure