ss; but
joy and gladness." Now the conversation and company of wisdom are
found in contemplation. Therefore there is no sorrow contrary to the
pleasure of contemplation.

_I answer that,_ The pleasure of contemplation can be understood in
two ways. In one way, so that contemplation is the cause, but not the
object of pleasure: and then pleasure is taken not in contemplating
but in the thing contemplated. Now it is possible to contemplate
something harmful and sorrowful, just as to contemplate something
suitable and pleasant. Consequently if the pleasure of contemplation
be taken in this way, nothing hinders some sorrow being contrary to
the pleasure of contemplation.

In another way, the pleasure of contemplation is understood, so that
contemplation is its object and cause; as when one takes pleasure in
the very act of contemplating. And thus, according to Gregory of
Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.], "no sorrow is contrary to
that pleasure which is about contemplation": and the Philosopher says
the same (Topic. i, 13; Ethic. x, 3). This, however, is to be
understood as being the case properly speaking. The reason is because
sorrow is of itself contrary to pleasure in a contrary object: thus
pleasure in heat is contrary to sorrow caused by cold. But there is
no contrary to the object of contemplation: because contraries, as
apprehended by the mind, are not contrary, but one is the means of
knowing the other. Wherefore, properly speaking, there cannot be a
sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. Nor has it any
sorrow annexed to it, as bodily pleasures have, which are like
remedies against certain annoyances; thus a man takes pleasure in
drinking through being troubled with thirst, but when the thirst is
quite driven out, the pleasure of drinking ceases also. Because the
pleasure of contemplation is not caused by one's being quit of an
annoyance, but by the fact that contemplation is pleasant in itself:
for pleasure is not a "becoming" but a perfect operation, as stated
above (Q. 31, A. 1).

Accidentally, however, sorrow is mingled with the pleasure of
contemplation; and this in two ways: first, on the part of an organ,
secondly, through some impediment in the apprehension. On the part of
an organ, sorrow or pain is mingled with apprehension, directly, as
regards the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part, which have a
bodily organ; either from the sensible object disagreeing with the
normal conditi