I, Q. 34, Art. 2]

Whether Every Pleasure Is Good?

Objection 1: It would seem that every pleasure is good. Because as
stated in the First Part (Q. 5, A. 6) there are three kinds of good:
the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. But everything virtuous
is good; and in like manner everything useful is good. Therefore also
every pleasure is good.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is not sought for the sake of something
else, is good in itself, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 6, 7. But pleasure
is not sought for the sake of something else; for it seems absurd to
ask anyone why he seeks to be pleased. Therefore pleasure is good in
itself. Now that which is predicated of a thing considered in itself,
is predicated thereof universally. Therefore every pleasure is good.

Obj. 3: Further, that which is desired by all, seems to be good of
itself: because good is "what all things seek," as stated in _Ethic._
i, 1. But everyone seeks some kind of pleasure, even children and
dumb animals. Therefore pleasure is good in itself: and consequently
all pleasure is good.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 2:14): "Who are glad when
they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things."

_I answer that,_ While some of the Stoics maintained that all
pleasures are evil, the Epicureans held that pleasure is good in
itself, and that consequently all pleasures are good. They seem to
have thus erred through not discriminating between that which is good
simply, and that which is good in respect of a particular individual.
That which is good simply, is good in itself. Now that which is not
good in itself, may be good in respect of some individual in two
ways. In one way, because it is suitable to him by reason of a
disposition in which he is now, which disposition, however, is not
natural: thus it is sometimes good for a leper to eat things that are
poisonous, which are not suitable simply to the human temperament. In
another way, through something unsuitable being esteemed suitable.
And since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in some good, if the
appetite reposes in that which is good simply, the pleasure will be
pleasure simply, and good simply. But if a man's appetite repose in
that which is good, not simply, but in respect of that particular
man, then his pleasure will not be pleasure simply, but a pleasure to
him; neither will it be good simply, but in a certain respect, or an
apparent good.

Reply Obj. 1: The virtuous and the use