is universally
pleasurable to the sensitive appetite both of good and of evil men.
But the will of the good man takes pleasure in them in accordance
with reason, to which the will of the evil man gives no heed.
Reply Obj. 1: Love and desire precede pleasure in the order of
generation. But pleasure precedes them in the order of the end, which
serves a principle in actions; and it is by the principle, which is
the rule and measure of such matters, that we form our judgment.
Reply Obj. 2: All pleasures are uniform in the point of their being
the repose of the appetite in something good: and in this respect
pleasure can be a rule or measure. Because that man is good, whose
will rests in the true good: and that man evil, whose will rests in
evil.
Reply Obj. 3: Since pleasure perfects operation as its end, as stated
above (Q. 33, A. 4); an operation cannot be perfectly good, unless
there be also pleasure in good: because the goodness of a thing
depends on its end. And thus, in a way, the goodness of the pleasure
is the cause of goodness in the operation.
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QUESTION 35
OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF
(In Eight Articles)
We have now to consider pain and sorrow: concerning which we must
consider: (1) Sorrow or pain in itself; (2) Its cause; (3) Its
effects; (4) Its remedies; (5) Its goodness or malice.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pain is a passion of the soul?
(2) Whether sorrow is the same as pain?
(3) Whether sorrow or pain is contrary [to] pleasure?
(4) Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?
(5) Whether there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation?
(6) Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be
sought?
(7) Whether exterior pain is greater than interior?
(8) Of the species of sorrow.
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 1]
Whether Pain Is a Passion of the Soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that pain is not a passion of the soul.
Because no passion of the soul is in the body. But pain can be in the
body, since Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii), that "bodily pain is
a sudden corruption of the well-being of that thing which the soul,
by making evil use of it, made subject to corruption." Therefore pain
is not a passion of the soul.
Obj. 2: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the appetitive
faculty. But pain does not belong to the appetitive, but rather t
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