FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   321   322   323   324   325   326   327   328   329   330   331   332   333   334   335   336   337   338   339   340   341   342   343   344   345  
346   347   348   349   350   351   352   353   354   355   356   357   358   359   360   361   362   363   364   365   366   367   368   369   370   >>   >|  
, as joy is a species of pleasure. Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking there of the use of the word: because "pain" is more generally used in reference to bodily pains, which are better known, than in reference to spiritual pains. Reply Obj. 2: External sense perceives only what is present; but the interior cognitive power can perceive the present, past and future. Consequently sorrow can regard present, past and future: whereas bodily pain, which follows apprehension of the external sense, can only regard something present. Reply Obj. 3: The sensibles of touch are painful, not only in so far as they are disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but also in so far as they are contrary to nature: whereas the objects of the other senses can indeed be disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but they are not contrary to nature, save as they are subordinate to the sensibles of touch. Consequently man alone, who is a perfectly cognizant animal, takes pleasure in the objects of the other senses for their own sake; whereas other animals take no pleasure in them save as referable to the sensibles of touch, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 10. Accordingly, in referring to the objects of the other senses, we do not speak of pain in so far as it is contrary to natural pleasure: but rather of sorrow, which is contrary to joy. So then if pain be taken as denoting bodily pain, which is its more usual meaning, then it is contrasted with sorrow, according to the distinction of interior and exterior apprehension; although, on the part of the objects, pleasure extends further than does bodily pain. But if pain be taken in a wide sense, then it is the genus of sorrow, as stated above. ________________________ THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 3] Whether Sorrow or Pain Is Contrary to Pleasure? Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not contrary to pleasure. For one of two contraries is not the cause of the other. But sorrow can be the cause of pleasure; for it is written (Matt. 5:5): "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore they are not contrary to one another. Obj. 2: Further, one contrary does not denominate the other. But to some, pain or sorrow gives pleasure: thus Augustine says (Confess. iii, 2) that in stage-plays sorrow itself gives pleasure: and (Confess. iv, 5) that "weeping is a bitter thing, and yet it sometimes pleases us." Therefore pain is not contrary to pleasure. Obj. 3: Fur
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   321   322   323   324   325   326   327   328   329   330   331   332   333   334   335   336   337   338   339   340   341   342   343   344   345  
346   347   348   349   350   351   352   353   354   355   356   357   358   359   360   361   362   363   364   365   366   367   368   369   370   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

pleasure

 

sorrow

 
contrary
 

bodily

 

present

 
objects
 
senses
 
sensibles
 

nature

 

apprehensive


disproportionate
 

stated

 

Augustine

 
Therefore
 
reference
 
regard
 
future
 

Consequently

 

apprehension

 
Confess

interior

 

Pleasure

 

Objection

 

Sorrow

 

extends

 
Contrary
 

ARTICLE

 

Whether

 

pleases

 

weeping


bitter

 

comforted

 
Further
 

denominate

 

contraries

 

written

 

Blessed

 
animals
 

painful

 

external


perceive

 

perfectly

 

cognizant

 

subordinate

 

cognitive

 
species
 
speaking
 

generally

 

External

 

perceives