ves to conceive a
certain love for those who are there represented.

Reply Obj. 3: The will and the reason reflect on their own acts,
inasmuch as the acts themselves of the will and reason are considered
under the aspect of good or evil. In this way sorrow can be the
matter of pleasure, or vice versa, not essentially but accidentally:
that is, in so far as either of them is considered under the aspect
of good or evil.
________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 4]

Whether All Sorrow Is Contrary to All Pleasure?

Objection 1: It would seem that all sorrow is contrary to all
pleasure. Because, just as whiteness and blackness are contrary
species of color, so pleasure and sorrow are contrary species of the
soul's passions. But whiteness and blackness are universally contrary
to one another. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are so too.

Obj. 2: Further, remedies are made of things contrary (to the evil).
But every pleasure is a remedy for all manner of sorrow, as the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore every pleasure is
contrary to every sorrow.

Obj. 3: Further, contraries are hindrances to one another. But every
sorrow hinders any kind of pleasure: as is evident from _Ethic._
x, 5. Therefore every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure.

_On the contrary,_ The same thing is not the cause of contraries. But
joy for one thing, and sorrow for the opposite thing, proceed from
the same habit: thus from charity it happens that we "rejoice with
them that rejoice," and "weep with them that weep" (Rom. 12:15).
Therefore not every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure.

_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, 4), contrariety
is a difference in respect of a form. Now a form may be generic or
specific. Consequently things may be contraries in respect of a
generic form, as virtue and vice; or in respect of a specific form,
as justice and injustice.

Now we must observe that some things are specified by absolute forms,
e.g. substances and qualities; whereas other things are specified in
relation to something extrinsic, e.g. passions and movements, which
derive their species from their terms or objects. Accordingly in
those things that are specified by absolute forms, it happens that
species contained under contrary genera are not contrary as to their
specific nature: but it does not happen for them to have any affinity
or fittingness to one another. For intemperance and justice, which
a