ful depend on accordance with
reason, and consequently nothing is virtuous or useful, without being
good. But the pleasant depends on agreement with the appetite, which
tends sometimes to that which is discordant from reason. Consequently
not every object of pleasure is good in the moral order which depends
on the order of reason.
Reply Obj. 2: The reason why pleasure is not sought for the sake of
something else is because it is repose in the end. Now the end may be
either good or evil; although nothing can be an end except in so far
as it is good in respect of such and such a man: and so too with
regard to pleasure.
Reply Obj. 3: All things seek pleasure in the same way as they seek
good: since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in good. But, just
as it happens that not every good which is desired, is of itself and
verily good; so not every pleasure is of itself and verily good.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 34, Art. 3]
Whether Any Pleasure Is the Greatest Good?
Objection 1: It would seem that no pleasure is the greatest good.
Because nothing generated is the greatest good: since generation
cannot be the last end. But pleasure is a consequence of generation:
for the fact that a thing takes pleasure is due to its being
established in its own nature, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 1).
Therefore no pleasure is the greatest good.
Obj. 2: Further, that which is the greatest good cannot be made
better by addition. But pleasure is made better by addition; since
pleasure together with virtue is better than pleasure without virtue.
Therefore pleasure is not the greatest good.
Obj. 3: Further, that which is the greatest good is universally good,
as being good of itself: since that which is such of itself is prior
to and greater than that which is such accidentally. But pleasure is
not universally good, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore pleasure is
not the greatest good.
_On the contrary,_ Happiness is the greatest good: since it is the
end of man's life. But Happiness is not without pleasure: for it is
written (Ps. 15:11): "Thou shalt fill me with joy with Thy
countenance; at Thy right hand are delights even to the end."
_I answer that,_ Plato held neither with the Stoics, who asserted
that all pleasures are evil, nor with the Epicureans, who maintained
that all pleasures are good; but he said that some are good, and some
evil; yet, so that no pleasure be the sovereign or greatest good.
B
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