asure: whereas the
man who is master of himself does not. Therefore pleasures are evil
in themselves and should be avoided.

Obj. 3: Further, "virtue and art are concerned about the difficult
and the good" (Ethic. ii, 3). But no art is ordained to pleasure.
Therefore pleasure is not something good.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 36:4): "Delight in the Lord."
Since, therefore, Divine authority leads to no evil, it seems that
not every pleasure is evil.

_I answer that,_ As stated in _Ethic._ x, 2, 3, some have maintained
that all pleasure is evil. The reason seems to have been that they
took account only of sensible and bodily pleasures which are more
manifest; since, also in other respects, the ancient philosophers did
not discriminate between the intelligible and the sensible, nor
between intellect and sense (De Anima iii, 3). And they held that all
bodily pleasures should be reckoned as bad, and thus that man, being
prone to immoderate pleasures, arrives at the mean of virtue by
abstaining from pleasure. But they were wrong in holding this
opinion. Because, since none can live without some sensible and
bodily pleasure, if they who teach that all pleasures are evil, are
found in the act of taking pleasure; men will be more inclined to
pleasure by following the example of their works instead of listening
to the doctrine of their words: since, in human actions and passions,
wherein experience is of great weight, example moves more than words.

We must therefore say that some pleasures are good, and that some are
evil. For pleasure is a repose of the appetitive power in some loved
good, and resulting from some operation; wherefore we assign a
twofold reason for this assertion. The first is in respect of the
good in which a man reposes with pleasure. For good and evil in the
moral order depend on agreement or disagreement with reason, as
stated above (Q. 18, A. 5): just as in the order of nature, a thing
is said to be natural, if it agrees with nature, and unnatural, if
it disagrees. Accordingly, just as in the natural order there is a
certain natural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which agrees
with its nature, for instance, when a heavy body rests down below;
and again an unnatural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which
disagrees with its nature, as when a heavy body rests up aloft: so,
in the moral order, there is a good pleasure, whereby the higher or
lower appetite rests in that which is in acc