o feel, to
will and the like: because actions which pass into outward matter,
are actions and perfections rather of the matter transformed; for
"movement is the act produced by the mover in the thing moved" (Phys.
iii, 3). Accordingly the aforesaid actions of the sensitive and
intellectual soul, are themselves a certain good of the agent, and
are known by sense and intellect. Wherefore from them also does
pleasure arise, and not only from their objects.

If therefore we compare intellectual pleasures with sensible
pleasures, according as we delight in the very actions, for instance
in sensitive and in intellectual knowledge; without doubt
intellectual pleasures are much greater than sensible pleasures. For
man takes much more delight in knowing something, by understanding
it, than in knowing something by perceiving it with his sense.
Because intellectual knowledge is more perfect; and because it is
better known, since the intellect reflects on its own act more than
sense does. Moreover intellectual knowledge is more beloved: for
there is no one who would not forfeit his bodily sight rather than
his intellectual vision, as beasts or fools are deprived thereof, as
Augustine says in De Civ. Dei (De Trin. xiv, 14).

If, however, intellectual spiritual pleasures be compared with
sensible bodily pleasures, then, in themselves and absolutely
speaking, spiritual pleasures are greater. And this appears from the
consideration of the three things needed for pleasure, viz. the good
which is brought into conjunction, that to which it is conjoined, and
the conjunction itself. For spiritual good is both greater and more
beloved than bodily good: a sign whereof is that men abstain from
even the greatest bodily pleasures, rather than suffer loss of honor
which is an intellectual good. Likewise the intellectual faculty is
much more noble and more knowing than the sensitive faculty. Also the
conjunction is more intimate, more perfect and more firm. More
intimate, because the senses stop at the outward accidents of a
thing, whereas the intellect penetrates to the essence; for the
object of the intellect is "what a thing is." More perfect, because
the conjunction of the sensible to the sense implies movement, which
is an imperfect act: wherefore sensible pleasures are not perceived
all at once, but some part of them is passing away, while some other
part is looked forward to as yet to be realized, as is manifest in
pleasures of the table