rther, "every one finds treasure in what he loves," as the
Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But "of all the senses the sight is
loved most" [*Metaph. i, 1]. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to
be afforded by sight.

Obj. 3: Further, the beginning of friendship which is for the sake of
the pleasant is principally sight. But pleasure is the cause of such
friendship. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by
sight.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), that the
greatest pleasures are those which are afforded by the touch.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 25, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 27, A. 4, ad
1), everything gives pleasure according as it is loved. Now, as
stated in _Metaph._ i, 1, the senses are loved for two reasons: for
the purpose of knowledge, and on account of their usefulness.
Wherefore the senses afford pleasure in both these ways. But because
it is proper to man to apprehend knowledge itself as something good,
it follows that the former pleasures of the senses, i.e. those which
arise from knowledge, are proper to man: whereas pleasures of the
senses, as loved for their usefulness, are common to all animals.

If therefore we speak of that sensible pleasure which is by reason of
knowledge, it is evident that the sight affords greater pleasure than
any other sense. On the other hand, if we speak of that sensible
pleasure which is by reason of usefulness, then the greatest pleasure
is afforded by the touch. For the usefulness of sensible things is
gauged by their relation to the preservation of the animal's nature.
Now the sensible objects of touch bear the closest relation to this
usefulness: for the touch takes cognizance of those things which are
vital to an animal, namely, of things hot and cold and the like.
Wherefore in this respect, the pleasures of touch are greater as
being more closely related to the end. For this reason, too, other
animals which do not experience sensible pleasure save by reason of
usefulness, derive no pleasure from the other senses except as
subordinated to the sensible objects of the touch: "for dogs do not
take delight in the smell of hares, but in eating them; . . . nor
does the lion feel pleasure in the lowing of an ox, but in devouring
it" (Ethic. iii, 10).

Since then the pleasure afforded by touch is the greatest in respect
of usefulness, and the pleasure afforded by sight the greatest in
respect of knowledge; if anyone wish to compare thes