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it be unlike sorrow, bears some likeness to the man that is
sorrowful: because sorrows are contrary to his own good. Wherefore
the sorrowful man seeks pleasure as making for his own good, in so
far as it is a remedy for its contrary. And this is why bodily
pleasures, which are contrary to certain sorrows, are more sought
than intellectual pleasures, which have no contrary sorrow, as we
shall state later on (Q. 35, A. 5). And this explains why all animals
naturally desire pleasure: because animals ever work through sense
and movement. For this reason also young people are most inclined to
seek pleasures; on account of the many changes to which they are
subject, while yet growing. Moreover this is why the melancholic has
a strong desire for pleasures, in order to drive away sorrow: because
his "body is corroded by a base humor," as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 14.
Reply Obj. 3: Bodily goods are conditioned by a certain fixed
measure: wherefore surfeit of such things destroys the proper good,
and consequently gives rise to disgust and sorrow, through being
contrary to the proper good of man.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 32, Art. 8]
Whether Wonder Is a Cause of Pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that wonder is not a cause of pleasure.
Because wonder is the act of one who is ignorant of the nature of
something, as Damascene says. But knowledge, rather than ignorance,
is a cause of pleasure. Therefore wonder is not a cause of pleasure.
Obj. 2: Further, wonder is the beginning of wisdom, being as it were,
the road to the search of truth, as stated in the beginning of
_Metaph._ i, 2. But "it is more pleasant to think of what we know,
than to seek what we know not," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x,
7): since in the latter case we encounter difficulties and
hindrances, in the former not; while pleasure arises from an
operation which is unhindered, as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 12, 13.
Therefore wonder hinders rather than causes pleasure.
Obj. 3: Further, everyone takes pleasure in what he is accustomed to:
wherefore the actions of habits acquired by custom, are pleasant. But
"we wonder at what is unwonted," as Augustine says (Tract. xxiv in
Joan.). Therefore wonder is contrary to the cause of pleasure.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that wonder is
the cause of pleasure.
_I answer that,_ It is pleasant to get what one desires, as stated
above (Q. 23, A. 4): and therefo
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