y afford the
greatest delight: except, perchance, accidentally, in so far as the
work of contemplation is accompanied by some operation of the bodily
powers, which tire from protracted activity. And in this sense also
we may understand those words of Ecclus. 24:29: "They that drink me
shall yet thirst": for, even of the angels, who know God perfectly,
and delight in Him, it is written (1 Pet. 1:12) that they "desire to
look at Him."
Lastly, if we consider pleasure, not as existing in reality, but as
existing in the memory, thus it has of itself a natural tendency to
cause thirst and desire for itself: when, to wit, man returns to that
disposition, in which he was when he experienced the pleasure that is
past. But if he be changed from that disposition, the memory of that
pleasure does not give him pleasure, but distaste: for instance, the
memory of food in respect of a man who has eaten to repletion.
Reply Obj. 1: When pleasure is perfect, then it includes complete
rest; and the movement of desire, tending to what was not possessed,
ceases. But when it is imperfect, then the desire, tending to what
was not possessed, does not cease altogether.
Reply Obj. 2: That which is possessed imperfectly, is possessed in
one respect, and in another respect is not possessed. Consequently it
may be the object of desire and pleasure at the same time.
Reply Obj. 3: Pleasures cause distaste in one way, desire in another,
as stated above.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 33, Art. 3]
Whether Pleasure Hinders the Use of Reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not hinder the use of
reason. Because repose facilitates very much the due use of reason:
wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 3) that "while we sit and
rest, the soul is inclined to knowledge and prudence"; and it is
written (Wis. 8:16): "When I go into my house, I shall repose myself
with her," i.e. wisdom. But pleasure is a kind of repose. Therefore
it helps rather than hinders the use of reason.
Obj. 2: Further, things which are not in the same subject though they
be contraries, do not hinder one another. But pleasure is in the
appetitive faculty, while the use of reason is in the apprehensive
power. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of reason.
Obj. 3: Further, that which is hindered by another, seems to be
moved, as it were, thereby. But the use of an apprehensive power
moves pleasure rather than is moved by it: be
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