f doing good: and in this regard,
doing good to another becomes pleasant, in so far as it arouses in
man an imagination of abundant good existing in him, whereof he is
able to give others a share. Wherefore men take pleasure in their
children, and in their own works, as being things on which they
bestow a share of their own good. Another principle is man's habitual
inclination to do good, by reason of which doing good becomes
connatural to him: for which reason the liberal man takes pleasure in
giving to others. The third principle is the motive: for instance
when a man is moved by one whom he loves, to do good to someone: for
whatever we do or suffer for a friend is pleasant, because love is
the principal cause of pleasure.

Reply Obj. 1: Spending gives pleasure as showing forth one's good.
But in so far as it empties us of our own good it may be a cause of
sadness; for instance when it is excessive.

Reply Obj. 2: Prodigality is an excessive spending, which is
unnatural: wherefore prodigality is said to be contrary to nature.

Reply Obj. 3: To overcome, to contradict, and to punish, give
pleasure, not as tending to another's ill, but as pertaining to one's
own good, which man loves more than he hates another's ill. For it is
naturally pleasant to overcome, inasmuch as it makes a man to
appreciate his own superiority. Wherefore all those games in which
there is a striving for the mastery, and a possibility of winning it,
afford the greatest pleasure: and speaking generally all contests, in
so far as they admit hope of victory. To contradict and to scold can
give pleasure in two ways. First, as making man imagine himself to be
wise and excellent; since it belongs to wise men and elders to
reprove and to scold. Secondly, in so far as by scolding and
reproving, one does good to another: for this gives one pleasure, as
stated above. It is pleasant to an angry man to punish, in so far as
he thinks himself to be removing an apparent slight, which seems to
be due to a previous hurt: for when a man is hurt by another, he
seems to be slighted thereby; and therefore he wishes to be quit of
this slight by paying back the hurt. And thus it is clear that doing
good to another may be of itself pleasant: whereas doing evil to
another is not pleasant, except in so far as it seems to affect one's
own good.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 32, Art. 7]

Whether Likeness Is a Cause of Pleasure?

Objection 1: It