ce--to such a one change will afford no delight. And the
more any pleasures approach to this, the more are they capable of
being continual.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the subject of movement has not yet perfectly
that to which it is moved, nevertheless it is beginning to have
something thereof: and in this respect movement itself has something
of pleasure. But it falls short of the perfection of pleasure;
because the more perfect pleasures regard things that are
unchangeable. Moreover movement becomes the cause of pleasure, in so
far as thereby something which previously was unsuitable, becomes
suitable or ceases to be, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: Movement causes toil and fatigue, when it exceeds our
natural aptitude. It is not thus that it causes pleasure, but by
removing the obstacles to our natural aptitude.

Reply Obj. 3: What is customary becomes pleasant, in so far as it
becomes natural: because custom is like a second nature. But the
movement which gives pleasure is not that which departs from custom,
but rather that which prevents the corruption of the natural mode of
being, that might result from continued operation. And thus from the
same cause of connaturalness, both custom and movement become
pleasant.
________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 32, Art. 3]

Whether Hope and Memory Cause Pleasure?

Objection 1: It would seem that memory and hope do not cause
pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by present good, as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). But hope and memory regard what is
absent: since memory is of the past, and hope of the future.
Therefore memory and hope do not cause pleasure.

Obj. 2: Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But
hope causes affliction, according to Prov. 13:12: "Hope that is
deferred afflicteth the soul." Therefore hope does not cause pleasure.

Obj. 3: Further, just as hope agrees with pleasure in regarding good,
so also do desire and love. Therefore hope should not be assigned as
a cause of pleasure, any more than desire or love.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 12:12): "Rejoicing in hope";
and (Ps. 76:4): "I remembered God, and was delighted."

_I answer that,_ Pleasure is caused by the presence of suitable good,
in so far as it is felt, or perceived in any way. Now a thing is
present to us in two ways. First, in knowledge--i.e. according as the
thing known is in the knower by its likeness; secondly, in
reality--i.e. according