_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 41:4): "My tears have been my
bread day and night": where bread denotes the refreshment of
pleasure. Therefore tears, which arise from sadness, can give
pleasure.

_I answer that,_ Sadness may be considered in two ways: as existing
actually, and as existing in the memory: and in both ways sadness can
cause pleasure. Because sadness, as actually existing, causes
pleasure, inasmuch as it brings to mind that which is loved, the
absence of which causes sadness; and yet the mere thought of it gives
pleasure. The recollection of sadness becomes a cause of pleasure, on
account of the deliverance which ensued: because absence of evil is
looked upon as something good; wherefore so far as a man thinks that
he has been delivered from that which caused him sorrow and pain, so
much reason has he to rejoice. Hence Augustine says in _De Civ. Dei_
xxii, 31 [*Gregory, Moral. iv.] that "oftentimes in joy we call to
mind sad things . . . and in the season of health we recall past
pains without feeling pain . . . and in proportion are the more
filled with joy and gladness": and again (Confess. viii, 3) he says
that "the more peril there was in the battle, so much the more joy
will there be in the triumph."

Reply Obj. 1: Sometimes accidentally a thing is the cause of its
contrary: thus "that which is cold sometimes causes heat," as stated
in _Phys._ viii, 1. In like manner sadness is the accidental cause of
pleasure, in so far as it gives rise to the apprehension of something
pleasant.

Reply Obj. 2: Sad things, called to mind, cause pleasure, not in so
far as they are sad and contrary to pleasant things; but in so far as
man is delivered from them. In like manner the recollection of
pleasant things, by reason of these being lost, may cause sadness.

Reply Obj. 3: Hatred also can be the accidental cause of love: i.e.
so far as some love one another, inasmuch as they agree in hating one
and the same thing.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 32, Art. 5]

Whether the Actions of Others Are a Cause of Pleasure to Us?

Objection 1: It would seem that the actions of others are not a cause
of pleasure to us. Because the cause of pleasure is our own good when
conjoined to us. But the actions of others are not conjoined to us.
Therefore they are not a cause of pleasure to us.

Obj. 2: Further, the action is the agent's own good. If, therefore,
the actions of others are a cause of pl