j. 1: The objects of operations are not pleasurable save
inasmuch as they are united to us; either by knowledge alone, as when
we take pleasure in thinking of or looking at certain things; or in
some other way in addition to knowledge; as when a man takes pleasure
in knowing that he has something good--riches, honor, or the like;
which would not be pleasurable unless they were apprehended as
possessed. For as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 2) "we take
great pleasure in looking upon a thing as our own, by reason of the
natural love we have for ourselves." Now to have such like things is
nothing else but to use them or to be able to use them: and this is
through some operation. Wherefore it is evident that every pleasure
is traced to some operation as its cause.
Reply Obj. 2: Even when it is not an operation, but the effect of an
operation, that is the end, this effect is pleasant in so far as
possessed or effected: and this implies use or operation.
Reply Obj. 3: Operations are pleasant, in so far as they are
proportionate and connatural to the agent. Now, since human power is
finite, operation is proportionate thereto according to a certain
measure. Wherefore if it exceed that measure, it will be no longer
proportionate or pleasant, but, on the contrary, painful and irksome.
And in this sense, leisure and play and other things pertaining to
repose, are pleasant, inasmuch as they banish sadness which results
from labor.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 32, Art. 2]
Whether Movement Is a Cause of Pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that movement is not a cause of pleasure.
Because, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 1), the good which is obtained
and is actually possessed, is the cause of pleasure: wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12) that pleasure is not compared with
generation, but with the operation of a thing already in existence.
Now that which is being moved towards something has it not as yet;
but, so to speak, is being generated in its regard, forasmuch as
generation or corruption are united to every movement, as stated in
_Phys._ viii, 3. Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure.
Obj. 2: Further, movement is the chief cause of toil and fatigue in
our works. But operations through being toilsome and fatiguing are
not pleasant but disagreeable. Therefore movement is not a cause of
pleasure.
Obj. 3: Further, movement implies a certain innovation, which is the
opposite
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