ese other names pertaining to delight are derived
from the effects of delight; for _laetitia_ (gladness) is derived
from the "dilation" of the heart, as if one were to say "latitia";
"exultation" is derived from the exterior signs of inward delight,
which appear outwardly in so far as the inward joy breaks forth from
its bounds; and "cheerfulness" is so called from certain special
signs and effects of gladness. Yet all these names seem to belong to
joy; for we do not employ them save in speaking of rational beings.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 4]

Whether Delight Is in the Intellectual Appetite?

Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not in the intellectual
appetite. Because the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that "delight is
a sensible movement." But sensible movement is not in an intellectual
power. Therefore delight is not in the intellectual appetite.

Obj. 2: Further, delight is a passion. But every passion is in the
sensitive appetite. Therefore delight is only in the sensitive
appetite.

Obj. 3: Further, delight is common to us and to the irrational
animals. Therefore it is not elsewhere than in that power which we
have in common with irrational animals.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 36:4): "Delight in the Lord."
But the sensitive appetite cannot reach to God; only the intellectual
appetite can. Therefore delight can be in the intellectual appetite.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), a certain delight arises
from the apprehension of the reason. Now on the reason apprehending
something, not only the sensitive appetite is moved, as regards its
application to some particular thing, but also the intellectual
appetite, which is called the will. And accordingly in the
intellectual appetite or will there is that delight which is called
joy, but not bodily delight.

However, there is this difference of delight in either power, that
delight of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a bodily
transmutation, whereas delight of the intellectual appetite is
nothing but the mere movement of the will. Hence Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "desire and joy are nothing else but a volition
of consent to the things we wish."

Reply Obj. 1: In this definition of the Philosopher, he uses the word
"sensible" in its wide acceptation for any kind of perception. For he
says (Ethic. x, 4) that "delight is attendant upon every sense, as it
is also upon every act of th