d with
nature, while passion is a movement contrary to nature." But delight
is an operation, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 5).
Therefore delight is not a passion.

Obj. 2: Further, "To be passive is to be moved," as stated in _Phys._
iii, 3. But delight does not consist in being moved, but in having
been moved; for it arises from good already gained. Therefore delight
is not a passion.

Obj. 3: Further, delight is a kind of a perfection of the one who is
delighted; since it "perfects operation," as stated in _Ethic._ x, 4,
5. But to be perfected does not consist in being passive or in being
altered, as stated in _Phys._ vii, 3 and _De Anima_ ii, 5. Therefore
delight is not a passion.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 2; xiv, 5 seqq) reckons
delight, joy, or gladness among the other passions of the soul.

_I answer that,_ The movements of the sensitive appetite, are
properly called passions, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3). Now every
emotion arising from a sensitive apprehension, is a movement of the
sensitive appetite: and this must needs be said of delight, since,
according to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11) "delight is a certain
movement of the soul and a sensible establishing thereof all at once,
in keeping with the nature of the thing."

In order to understand this, we must observe that just as in natural
things some happen to attain to their natural perfections, so does
this happen in animals. And though movement towards perfection does
not occur all at once, yet the attainment of natural perfection does
occur all at once. Now there is this difference between animals and
other natural things, that when these latter are established in the
state becoming their nature, they do not perceive it, whereas animals
do. And from this perception there arises a certain movement of the
soul in the sensitive appetite; which movement is called delight.
Accordingly by saying that delight is "a movement of the soul," we
designate its genus. By saying that it is "an establishing in keeping
with the thing's nature," i.e. with that which exists in the thing, we
assign the cause of delight, viz. the presence of a becoming good. By
saying that this establishing is "all at once," we mean that this
establishing is to be understood not as in the process of
establishment, but as in the fact of complete establishment, in the
term of the movement, as it were: for delight is not a "becoming" as
Plato [*Phileb