which correspond different degrees of hatred. Wherefore a hatred that
corresponds to a greater love, moves us more than a lesser love.

Hence it is clear how to reply to the First Objection. For the love
of pleasure is less than the love of self-preservation, to which
corresponds flight from pain. Wherefore we flee from pain more than
we love pleasure.

Reply Obj. 2: Hatred would never overcome love, were it not for the
greater love to which that hatred corresponds. Thus man loves
himself, more than he loves his friend: and because he loves himself,
his friend is hateful to him, if he oppose him.

Reply Obj. 3: The reason why we act with greater insistence in
repelling what is hateful, is because we feel hatred more keenly.
________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 29, Art. 4]

Whether a Man Can Hate Himself?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man can hate himself. For it is
written (Ps. 10:6): "He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul."
But many love iniquity. Therefore many hate themselves.

Obj. 2: Further, him we hate, to whom we wish and work evil. But
sometimes a man wishes and works evil to himself, e.g. a man who
kills himself. Therefore some men hate themselves.

Obj. 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that "avarice makes a
man hateful"; whence we may conclude that everyone hates a miser. But
some men are misers. Therefore they hate themselves.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 5:29) that "no man ever
hated his own flesh."

_I answer that,_ Properly speaking, it is impossible for a man to
hate himself. For everything naturally desires good, nor can anyone
desire anything for himself, save under the aspect of good: for "evil
is outside the scope of the will," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Now to love a man is to will good to him, as stated above (Q. 26, A.
4). Consequently, a man must, of necessity, love himself; and it is
impossible for a man to hate himself, properly speaking.

But accidentally it happens that a man hates himself: and this in two
ways. First, on the part of the good which a man wills to himself.
For it happens sometimes that what is desired as good in some
particular respect, is simply evil; and in this way, a man
accidentally wills evil to himself; and thus hates himself. Secondly,
in regard to himself, to whom he wills good. For each thing is that
which is predominant in it; wherefore the state is said to do what
the king does, as if the king w