red, neither in general nor in particular.
Being and truth in general cannot be the object of hatred: because
disagreement is the cause of hatred, and agreement is the cause of
love; while being and truth are common to all things. But nothing
hinders some particular being or some particular truth being an
object of hatred, in so far as it is considered as hurtful and
repugnant; since hurtfulness and repugnance are not incompatible with
the notion of being and truth, as they are with the notion of good.

Now it may happen in three ways that some particular truth is
repugnant or hurtful to the good we love. First, according as truth
is in things as in its cause and origin. And thus man sometimes hates
a particular truth, when he wishes that what is true were not true.
Secondly, according as truth is in man's knowledge, which hinders him
from gaining the object loved: such is the case of those who wish not
to know the truth of faith, that they may sin freely; in whose person
it is said (Job 21:14): "We desire not the knowledge of Thy ways."
Thirdly, a particular truth is hated, as being repugnant, inasmuch as
it is in the intellect of another man: as, for instance, when a man
wishes to remain hidden in his sin, he hates that anyone should know
the truth about his sin. In this respect, Augustine says (Confess. x,
23) that men "love truth when it enlightens, they hate it when it
reproves." This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: The knowledge of truth is lovable in itself: hence
Augustine says that men love it when it enlightens. But accidentally,
the knowledge of truth may become hateful, in so far as it hinders
one from accomplishing one's desire.

Reply Obj. 3: The reason why we love those who are straightforward is
that they make known the truth, and the knowledge of the truth,
considered in itself, is a desirable thing.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 29, Art. 6]

Whether Anything Can Be an Object of Universal Hatred?

Objection 1: It would seem that a thing cannot be an object of
universal hatred. Because hatred is a passion of the sensitive
appetite, which is moved by an apprehension in the senses. But the
senses cannot apprehend the universal. Therefore a thing cannot be an
object of universal hatred.

Obj. 2: Further, hatred is caused by disagreement; and where there is
disagreement, there is nothing in common. But the notion of
universality implies something in