the sense is a power seated in a bodily organ: wherefore
sensible good is the good of the whole composite. Now concupiscence
seems to be the craving for this latter pleasure, since it belongs to
the united soul and body, as is implied by the Latin word
"concupiscentia." Therefore, properly speaking, concupiscence is in
the sensitive appetite, and in the concupiscible faculty, which takes
its name from it.

Reply Obj. 1: The craving for wisdom, or other spiritual goods, is
sometimes called concupiscence; either by reason of a certain
likeness; or on account of the craving in the higher part of the soul
being so vehement that it overflows into the lower appetite, so that
the latter also, in its own way, tends to the spiritual good,
following the lead of the higher appetite, the result being that the
body itself renders its service in spiritual matters, according to
Ps. 83:3: "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God."

Reply Obj. 2: Properly speaking, desire may be not only in the lower,
but also in the higher appetite. For it does not imply fellowship in
craving, as concupiscence does; but simply movement towards the thing
desired.

Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to each power of the soul to seek its proper
good by the natural appetite, which does not arise from apprehension.
But the craving for good, by the animal appetite, which arises from
apprehension, belongs to the appetitive power alone. And to crave a
thing under the aspect of something delightful to the senses, wherein
concupiscence properly consists, belongs to the concupiscible power.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 30, Art. 2]

Whether Concupiscence Is a Specific Passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not a specific
passion of the concupiscible power. For passions are distinguished by
their objects. But the object of the concupiscible power is something
delightful to the senses; and this is also the object of
concupiscence, as the Philosopher declares (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore
concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible faculty.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that "covetousness
is the love of transitory things": so that it is not distinct from
love. But all specific passions are distinct from one another.
Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion in the
concupiscible faculty.

Obj. 3: Further, to each passion of the concupiscible faculty there
is a specific con