ut nothing hinders a thing from being common to many, and at
variance with others, so as to be hateful to them.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the universal under the aspect
of universality: and thus it does not come under the sensitive
apprehension or appetite.
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QUESTION 30

OF CONCUPISCENCE
(In Four Articles)

We have now to consider concupiscence: under which head there are
four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only?

(2) Whether concupiscence is a specific passion?

(3) Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural?

(4) Whether concupiscence is infinite?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 30, Art. 1]

Whether Concupiscence Is in the Sensitive Appetite Only?

Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not only in the
sensitive appetite. For there is a concupiscence of wisdom, according
to Wis. 6:21: "The concupiscence [Douay: 'desire'] of wisdom bringeth
to the everlasting kingdom." But the sensitive appetite can have no
tendency to wisdom. Therefore concupiscence is not only in the
sensitive appetite.

Obj. 2: Further, the desire for the commandments of God is not in the
sensitive appetite: in fact the Apostle says (Rom. 7:18): "There
dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good."
But desire for God's commandments is an act of concupiscence,
according to Ps. 118:20: "My soul hath coveted (_concupivit_) to long
for thy justifications." Therefore concupiscence is not only in the
sensitive appetite.

Obj. 3: Further, to each power, its proper good is a matter of
concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence is in each power of the soul,
and not only in the sensitive appetite.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the
irrational part which is subject and amenable to reason, is divided
into the faculties of concupiscence and anger. This is the irrational
part of the soul, passive and appetitive." Therefore concupiscence is
in the sensitive appetite.

_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11),
"concupiscence is a craving for that which is pleasant." Now pleasure
is twofold, as we shall state later on (Q. 31, AA. 3, 4): one is in
the intelligible good, which is the good of reason; the other is in
good perceptible to the senses. The former pleasure seems to belong
to soul alone: whereas the latter belongs to both soul and body:
because