desires pleasure." But flight from pain
pertains to hatred; while desire for pleasure belongs to love.
Therefore hatred is stronger than love.

Obj. 2: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. But love is
overcome by hatred: when, that is to say, love is turned into hatred.
Therefore hatred is stronger than love.

Obj. 3: Further, the emotions of the soul are shown by their effects.
But man insists more on repelling what is hateful, than on seeking
what is pleasant: thus also irrational animals refrain from pleasure
for fear of the whip, as Augustine instances (QQ. 83, qu. 36).
Therefore hatred is stronger than love.

_On the contrary,_ Good is stronger than evil; because "evil does
nothing except in virtue of good," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
But hatred and love differ according to the difference of good and
evil. Therefore love is stronger than hatred.

_I answer that,_ It is impossible for an effect to be stronger than
its cause. Now every hatred arises from some love as its cause, as
above stated (A. 2). Therefore it is impossible for hatred to be
stronger than love absolutely.

But furthermore, love must needs be, absolutely speaking, stronger
than hatred. Because a thing is moved to the end more strongly than
to the means. Now turning away from evil is directed as a means to
the gaining of good. Wherefore, absolutely speaking, the soul's
movement in respect of good is stronger than its movement in respect
of evil.

Nevertheless hatred sometimes seems to be stronger than love, for two
reasons. First, because hatred is more keenly felt than love. For,
since the sensitive perception is accompanied by a certain
impression; when once the impression has been received it is not felt
so keenly as in the moment of receiving it. Hence the heat of a
hectic fever, though greater, is nevertheless not felt so much as the
heat of tertian fever; because the heat of the hectic fever is
habitual and like a second nature. For this reason, love is felt more
keenly in the absence of the object loved; thus Augustine says (De
Trin. x, 12) that "love is felt more keenly when we lack what we
love." And for the same reason, the unbecomingness of that which is
hated is felt more keenly than the becomingness of that which is
loved. Secondly, because comparison is made between a hatred and a
love which are not mutually corresponding. Because, according to
different degrees of good there are different degrees of love to