of good in relation to the common estate;
whereas the thief's wife has to consider the private good of the
family, and from this point of view she wishes her husband, the
thief, not to be put to death. Now the good of the whole universe is
that which is apprehended by God, Who is the Maker and Governor of
all things: hence whatever He wills, He wills it under the aspect of
the common good; this is His own Goodness, which is the good of the
whole universe. On the other hand, the apprehension of a creature,
according to its nature, is of some particular good, proportionate to
that nature. Now a thing may happen to be good under a particular
aspect, and yet not good under a universal aspect, or vice versa, as
stated above. And therefore it comes to pass that a certain will is
good from willing something considered under a particular aspect,
which thing God wills not, under a universal aspect, and vice versa.
And hence too it is, that various wills of various men can be good in
respect of opposite things, for as much as, under various aspects,
they wish a particular thing to be or not to be.

But a man's will is not right in willing a particular good, unless he
refer it to the common good as an end: since even the natural appetite
of each part is ordained to the common good of the whole. Now it is
the end that supplies the formal reason, as it were, of willing
whatever is directed to the end. Consequently, in order that a man
will some particular good with a right will, he must will that
particular good materially, and the Divine and universal good,
formally. Therefore the human will is bound to be conformed to the
Divine will, as to that which is willed formally, for it is bound to
will the Divine and universal good; but not as to that which is willed
materially, for the reason given above.

At the same time in both these respects, the human will is conformed
to the Divine, in a certain degree. Because inasmuch as it is
conformed to the Divine will in the common aspect of the thing willed,
it is conformed thereto in the point of the last end. While, inasmuch
as it is not conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed
materially, it is conformed to that will considered as efficient
cause; since the proper inclination consequent to nature, or to the
particular apprehension of some particular thing, comes to a thing
from God as its efficient cause. Hence it is customary to say that a
man's will, in this respect, is confo