g and to be transmuted: hence this happens only in those
things that are composed of matter and form. But passivity, as
implying mere reception, need not be in matter, but can be in
anything that is in potentiality. Now, though the soul is not
composed of matter and form, yet it has something of potentiality, in
respect of which it is competent to receive or to be passive,
according as the act of understanding is a kind of passion, as stated
in _De Anima_ iii, 4.
Reply Obj. 2: Although it does not belong to the soul in
itself to be passive and to be moved, yet it belongs accidentally as
stated in _De Anima_ i, 3.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument is true of passion accompanied by
transmutation to something worse. And passion, in this sense, is not
found in the soul, except accidentally: but the composite, which is
corruptible, admits of it by reason of its own nature.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 22, Art. 2]
Whether Passion Is in the Appetitive Rather Than in the Apprehensive
Part?
Objection 1: It would seem that passion is in the apprehensive part
of the soul rather than in the appetitive. Because that which is
first in any genus, seems to rank first among all things that are in
that genus, and to be their cause, as is stated in _Metaph._ ii, 1.
Now passion is found to be in the apprehensive, before being in the
appetitive part: for the appetitive part is not affected unless there
be a previous passion in the apprehensive part. Therefore passion is
in the apprehensive part more than in the appetitive.
Obj. 2: Further, what is more active is less passive; for action is
contrary to passion. Now the appetitive part is more active than the
apprehensive part. Therefore it seems that passion is more in the
apprehensive part.
Obj. 3: Further, just as the sensitive appetite is the power of a
corporeal organ, so is the power of sensitive apprehension. But
passion in the soul occurs, properly speaking, in respect of a bodily
transmutation. Therefore passion is not more in the sensitive
appetitive than in the sensitive apprehensive part.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "the
movement of the soul, which the Greeks called _pathe_, are styled by
some of our writers, Cicero [*"Those things which the Greeks call
_pathe_, we prefer to call disturbances rather than diseases" (Tusc.
iv. 5)] for instance, disturbances; by some, affections or emotions;
while others rendering the
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