versal good, is a more powerful active force than the object
of the sensitive appetite, which is a particular good. Therefore
passion is more consistent with the intellectual than with the
sensitive appetite.
Obj. 3: Further, joy and love are said to be passions. But these are
to be found in the intellectual and not only in the sensitive
appetite: else they would not be ascribed by the Scriptures to God
and the angels. Therefore the passions are not more in the sensitive
than in the intellectual appetite.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22), while
describing the animal passions: "Passion is a movement of the
sensitive appetite when we imagine good or evil: in other words,
passion is a movement of the irrational soul, when we think of good
or evil."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1) passion is properly to be
found where there is corporeal transmutation. This corporeal
transmutation is found in the act of the sensitive appetite, and is
not only spiritual, as in the sensitive apprehension, but also
natural. Now there is no need for corporeal transmutation in the act
of the intellectual appetite: because this appetite is not exercised
by means of a corporeal organ. It is therefore evident that passion
is more properly in the act of the sensitive appetite, than in that
of the intellectual appetite; and this is again evident from the
definitions of Damascene quoted above.
Reply Obj. 1: By "suffering" Divine things is meant being well
affected towards them, and united to them by love: and this takes
place without any alteration in the body.
Reply Obj. 2: Intensity of passion depends not only on the power of
the agent, but also on the passibility of the patient: because things
that are disposed to passion, suffer much even from petty agents.
Therefore although the object of the intellectual appetite has
greater activity than the object of the sensitive appetite, yet the
sensitive appetite is more passive.
Reply Obj. 3: When love and joy and the like are ascribed to God or
the angels, or to man in respect of his intellectual appetite, they
signify simple acts of the will having like effects, but without
passion. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "The holy angels
feel no anger while they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery
while they relieve the unhappy: and yet ordinary human speech is wont
to ascribe to them also these passions by name, because, although
they have none of
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