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good, while the irascible passions regard a restricted, viz. the
difficult, good. Since, therefore, the absolute good precedes the
restricted good, it seems that the concupiscible passions precede
the irascible.
_I answer that,_ In the concupiscible passions there is more
diversity than in the passions of the irascible faculty. For in the
former we find something relating to movement--e.g. desire; and
something belonging to repose, e.g. joy and sadness. But in the
irascible passions there is nothing pertaining to repose, and only
that which belongs to movement. The reason of this is that when we
find rest in a thing, we no longer look upon it as something
difficult or arduous; whereas such is the object of the irascible
faculty.
Now since rest is the end of movement, it is first in the order of
intention, but last in the order of execution. If, therefore, we
compare the passions of the irascible faculty with those
concupiscible passions that denote rest in good, it is evident that
in the order of execution, the irascible passions take precedence of
such like passions of the concupiscible faculty: thus hope precedes
joy, and hence causes it, according to the Apostle (Rom. 12:12):
"Rejoicing in hope." But the concupiscible passion which denotes rest
in evil, viz. sadness, comes between two irascible passions: because
it follows fear; since we become sad when we are confronted by the
evil that we feared: while it precedes the movement of anger; since
the movement of self-vindication, that results from sadness, is the
movement of anger. And because it is looked upon as a good thing to
pay back the evil done to us; when the angry man has achieved this
he rejoices. Thus it is evident that every passion of the irascible
faculty terminates in a concupiscible passion denoting rest, viz.
either in joy or in sadness.
But if we compare the irascible passions to those concupiscible
passions that denote movement, then it is clear that the latter take
precedence: because the passions of the irascible faculty add
something to those of the concupiscible faculty; just as the object
of the irascible adds the aspect of arduousness or difficulty to the
object of the concupiscible faculty. Thus hope adds to desire a
certain effort, and a certain raising of the spirits to the
realization of the arduous good. In like manner fear adds to aversion
or detestation a certain lowness of spirits, on account of difficulty
in shunning the
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