intellectual or rational love.

Reply Obj. 2: Love is spoken of as being fear, joy, desire and
sadness, not essentially but causally.

Reply Obj. 3: Natural love is not only in the powers of the
vegetal soul, but in all the soul's powers, and also in all the parts
of the body, and universally in all things: because, as Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv), "Beauty and goodness are beloved by all things"; since
each single thing has a connaturalness with that which is naturally
suitable to it.
________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 26, Art. 2]

Whether Love Is a Passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that love is not a passion. For no power
is a passion. But every love is a power, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
iv). Therefore love is not a passion.

Obj. 2: Further, love is a kind of union or bond, as Augustine says
(De Trin. viii, 10). But a union or bond is not a passion, but rather
a relation. Therefore love is not a passion.

Obj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that passion
is a movement. But love does not imply the movement of the appetite;
for this is desire, of which movement love is the principle.
Therefore love is not a passion.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "love
is a passion."

_I answer that,_ Passion is the effect of the agent on the patient.
Now a natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient: for in
the first place it gives it the form; and secondly it gives it the
movement that results from the form. Thus the generator gives the
generated body both weight and the movement resulting from weight: so
that weight, from being the principle of movement to the place, which
is connatural to that body by reason of its weight, can, in a way, be
called "natural love." In the same way the appetible object gives the
appetite, first, a certain adaptation to itself, which consists in
complacency in that object; and from this follows movement towards
the appetible object. For "the appetitive movement is circular," as
stated in _De Anima_ iii, 10; because the appetible object moves the
appetite, introducing itself, as it were, into its intention; while
the appetite moves towards the realization of the appetible object,
so that the movement ends where it began. Accordingly, the first
change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called
"love," and is nothing else than complacency in that object; and from
this complacency results a moveme