very passion is in the concupiscible power;
indeed, fear, which is mentioned in this passage, is in the irascible
power. Therefore we must not say absolutely that love is in the
concupiscible power.
Obj. 3: Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) mentions a "natural love."
But natural love seems to pertain rather to the natural powers, which
belong to the vegetal soul. Therefore love is not simply in the
concupiscible power.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7) that "love is
in the concupiscible power."
_I answer that,_ Love is something pertaining to the appetite; since
good is the object of both. Wherefore love differs according to the
difference of appetites. For there is an appetite which arises from
an apprehension existing, not in the subject of the appetite, but in
some other: and this is called the _natural appetite._ Because
natural things seek what is suitable to them according to their
nature, by reason of an apprehension which is not in them, but in the
Author of their nature, as stated in the First Part (Q. 6, A. 1, ad
2; Q. 103, A. 1, ad 1, 3). And there is another appetite arising from
an apprehension in the subject of the appetite, but from necessity
and not from free-will. Such is, in irrational animals, the
_sensitive appetite,_ which, however, in man, has a certain share of
liberty, in so far as it obeys reason. Again, there is another
appetite following freely from an apprehension in the subject of the
appetite. And this is the rational or intellectual appetite, which is
called the _will._
Now in each of these appetites, the name "love" is given to the
principle of movement towards the end loved. In the natural appetite
the principle of this movement is the appetitive subject's
connaturalness with the thing to which it tends, and may be called
"natural love": thus the connaturalness of a heavy body for the
centre, is by reason of its weight and may be called "natural love."
In like manner the aptitude of the sensitive appetite or of the will
to some good, that is to say, its very complacency in good is called
"sensitive love," or "intellectual" or "rational love." So that
sensitive love is in the sensitive appetite, just as intellectual
love is in the intellectual appetite. And it belongs to the
concupiscible power, because it regards good absolutely, and not
under the aspect of difficulty, which is the object of the irascible
faculty.
Reply Obj. 1: The words quoted refer to
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